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Abstract. We give exponential lower bounds on the Price of Stability (PoS) of weighted con-
gestion games with polynomial cost functions. In particular, for any positive integer d we construct
rather simple games with cost functions of degree at most d which have a PoS of at least Ω(Φd)
d+1,
where Φd ∼ d/ ln d is the unique positive root of equation xd+1 = (x + 1)d. This almost closes the
huge gap between Θ(d) and Φd+1d . Our bound extends also to network congestion games. We further
show that the PoS remains exponential even for singleton games. More generally, we provide a lower
bound of Ω((1 + 1/α)d/d) on the PoS of α-approximate Nash equilibria for singleton games. All our
lower bounds hold for mixed and correlated equilibria as well.
On the positive side, we give a general upper bound on the PoS of α-approximate Nash equilibria,
which is sensitive to the range W of the player weights and the approximation parameter α. We do
this by explicitly constructing a novel approximate potential function, based on Faulhaber’s formula,
that generalizes Rosenthal’s potential in a continuous, analytic way. From the general theorem,
we deduce two interesting corollaries. First, we derive the existence of an approximate pure Nash
equilibrium with PoS at most (d + 3)/2; the equilibrium’s approximation parameter ranges from
Θ(1) to d+ 1 in a smooth way with respect to W . Secondly, we show that for unweighted congestion
games, the PoS of α-approximate Nash equilibria is at most (d+ 1)/α.
Key words. congestion games, price of stability, Nash equilibrium, approximate equilibrium,
potential games
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1. Introduction. In the last 20 years, a central strand of research within Algo-
rithmic Game Theory has focused on understanding and quantifying the inefficiency
of equilibria compared to centralized, optimal solutions. There are two standard con-
cepts that measure this inefficiency. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) [38] which takes
the worst-case perspective, compares the worst-case equilibrium with the system op-
timum. It is a very robust measure of performance. On the other hand, the Price
of Stability (PoS) [51, 5], which is also the focus of this work, takes an optimistic
perspective, and uses the best-case equilibrium for this comparison. The PoS is an
appropriate concept to analyse the ideal solution that we would like our protocols to
produce.
The initial set of problems that arose from the Price of Anarchy theory have now
been resolved. The most rich and well-studied among these models are, arguably, the
atomic and non-atomic variants of congestion games (see [44, Ch. 18] for a detailed
discussion). This class of games is very descriptive and captures a large variety of
scenarios where users compete for resources, most prominently routing games. The
seminal work of Roughgarden and Tardos [49, 50] gave the answer for the non-atomic
variant, where each player controls a negligible amount of traffic. Awerbuch et al.
[6], Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [18] resolved the Price of Anarchy for atomic con-
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gestion games with affine latencies, generalized by Aland et al. [3] to polynomials; this
led to the development of Roughgarden’s Smoothness Framework [48] which extended
the bounds to general cost functions, but also distilled and formulated previous ideas
to bound the Price of Anarchy in an elegant, unified framework. At the computational
complexity front, we know that even for simple congestion games, finding a (pure)
Nash equilibrium is a PLS-complete problem [24, 2].
Allowing the players to have different loads, gives rise to the class of weighted
congestion games [47]; this is a natural and very important generalization of congestion
games, with numerous applications in routing and scheduling. Unfortunately though,
an immediate dichotomy between weighted and unweighted congestion games occurs:
the former may not even have pure Nash equilibria [41, 28, 30, 33]; as a matter of fact,
it is a strongly NP-hard problem to even determine if that is the case [23]. Moreover,
in such games there does not, in general, exist a potential function [43, 34], which is
the main tool for proving equilibrium existence in the unweighted case.
As a result, a sharp contrast with respect to our understanding of the two afore-
mentioned inefficiency notions arises. The Price of Anarchy has been studied in depth
and general techniques for providing tight bounds are known. Moreover, the asymp-
totic behaviour of weighted and unweighted congestion games with respect to the
Price of Anarchy is identical; it is Θ(d/ log d)d for both classes when latencies are
polynomials of degree at most d [3].
The situation for the Price of Stability though, is completely different. For un-
weighted games we have a good understanding1 and the values are much lower than
the Price of Anarchy values, and also tight; approximately 1.577 for affine func-
tions [19, 13], and Θ(d) [17] for polynomials. For weighted games though there is
a huge gap; the current state of the art lower bound is Θ(d) and the upper bound is
Θ(d/ ln d)d. These previous results are summarized at the left of Table 1.1a.
The main focus of this work is precisely to deal with this lack of understanding,
and to determine the Price of Stability of weighted congestion games. What makes
this problem challenging is that the only general known technique for showing upper
bounds for the Price of Stability is the potential method, which is applicable only to
potential games. In a nutshell, the idea of this method is to use the global minimizer
of Rosenthal’s potential [46] as an equilibrium refinement. This equilibrium is also
a pure Nash equilibrium and can serve as an upper bound of the Price of Stability.
Interestingly, it turns out that, for several classes of potential games, this technique
actually provides the tight answer (see for example [5, 19, 13, 17]). However, as
already mentioned above, unlike their unweighted counterparts, weighted congestion
games are not potential games;2 so, a completely fresh approach is required. One way
to override the aforementioned limitations of non-existence of pure Nash equilibria,
1Much work has been also done on the PoS for network design games, which is though not so
closely related to ours; in such games the cost of using an edge is split equally among players, and
thus cost functions are decreasing, as opposed to our model of congestion games with nondecreasing
latencies. This problem was first studied by Anshelevich et al. [5] who showed a tight bound of
Hn, the harmonic number of the number of players n, for directed networks. Finding tight bounds
on undirected networks is still a long-standing open problem (see, e.g., [27, 10, 39]). Recently, Bilo`
et al. [12] (asymptotically) resolved the question for broadcast networks. For the weighted variant
of this problem, Albers [4] showed a lower bound of Ω(logW/ log logW ), where W is the sum of the
players’ weights, while Chen and Roughgarden [16] an upper bound of O(logW/α) for α-approximate
equilibria (the latter is similar in spirit to our results in Section 4). See [12, 4] and references therein
for a thorough discussion of those results.
2For the special case of weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, a potential does
exist [28] and this was used by [9] to provide a PoS upper bound of 2.
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Table 1.1
The Price of Anarchy and Stability for unweighted and weighted congestion games, with poly-
nomial latency functions of maximum degree d. Φd is the unique positive solution of (x+1)
d = xd+1
and Φd = Θ(d/ log d). Tight answers were known for all settings, except for the Price of Stability of
the weighted case were only trivial bounds existed. In this paper we almost close this gap by showing
a lower bound of Ω(Φd)
d+1 (Theorem 3.1), which remains exponential even for singleton games
(Theorem 3.5).
(a) Previous results
PoA PoS
unweighted bΦdcd+1 [3] Θ(d) [17]
weighted Φd+1d [3] [Θ(d),Φ
d+1
d ]
(b) This paper
PoS lower bound
general Ω(Φd)
d+1
singleton Ω(2d/d)
α-approximate
equilibria
Ω((1 + 1/α)d/d)
but also their computational hardness, is to consider approximate equilibria. In this
direction, Hansknecht et al. [32] have shown that (d + 1)-approximate pure Nash
equilibria always exist in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of
maximum degree d, while, in the negative side, there exist games that do not have
1.153-approximate pure Nash equilibria. Notice here, that these results do not take
into account computational complexity considerations; if we insist in polynomial-time
algorithms for actually finding those equilibria, then the currently best approximation
parameter becomes dO(d) [14, 15, 26].
1.1. Our Results. We provide lower and upper bounds on the Price of Stability
for the class of weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies with nonnegative
coefficients. We consider both exact and approximate equilibria. Our lower bounds
are summarized at Table 1.1b.
Lower Bound for Weighted Congestion Games. In our main result in Theorem 3.1,
we resolve a long-standing open problem by providing almost tight bounds for the
Price of Stability of weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions.
We construct an instance having a Price of Stability of Ω(Φd)
d+1, where d is the
maximum degree of the latencies and Φd ∼ dln d is the unique positive solution of
equation (x+ 1)d = xd+1.
This bound almost closes the previously huge gap between Θ(d) and Φd+1d for the
PoS of weighted congestion games. The previously best lower and upper bounds were
rather trivial: the lower bound corresponds to the PoS results of Christodoulou and
Gairing [17] for the unweighted case (and thus, it is also a valid lower bound for the
general weighted case as well) and the upper bound comes from the Price of Anarchy
results of Aland et al. [3] (PoA, by definition, upper-bounds PoS). It is important
to make clear here that our lower bound still leaves an open gap for future work:
the constant within the base of Ω(Φd) in Theorem 3.1 produces a lower bound of
( 12Φd)
d+1, which is formally a factor of 2d+1 away from the Φd+1d PoA upper bound.
Although as mentioned before, weighted congestion games do not always possess
pure equilibria, our lower bound construction involves a unique equilibrium occurring
by iteratively eliminating strongly dominated strategies. As a result, this lower bound
holds not only for pure, but mixed and correlated equilibria as well.
Singleton Games. Next we switch to the class of singleton congestion games,
where a pure strategy for each player is a single resource. This class is very well-
studied as, on one hand, it abstracts scheduling environments, and on the other, it
4 G. CHRISTODOULOU, M. GAIRING, Y. GIANNAKOPOULOS, AND P. G. SPIRAKIS
has very attractive equilibrium properties; unlike general weighted congestion games,
there exists an (ordinal) lexicographic potential [29, 35], thus implying the existence of
pure Nash equilibria. It is important to note that the tight lower bounds for the Price
of Anarchy of general weighted congestion games hold also for the class of singleton
games [13, 8, 11].
Even for this special class, we show in Theorem 3.5 an exponential lower bound
of Ω(2d/d). The previous best lower and upper bounds were the same as those of the
general case, namely Θ(d) and Φd+1d , respectively. As a matter of fact, this new lower
bound comes as a corollary of a more general result that we show in Theorem 3.5, that
extends to approximate equilibria and gives a lower bound of Ω((1 + 1/α)d/d) on the
PoS of α-approximate equilibria, for any (multiplicative) approximation parameter
α ∈ [1, d). Setting α = 1 we recover the special case of exact equilibria and the
aforementioned exponential lower bound on the standard, exact notion of the PoS.
Notice here that, as we show in Theorem D.1, the optimal solution (which, in general,
is not an equilibrium) itself constitutes a (d + 1)-approximate equilibrium with a
(trivially) optimal PoS of 1.
Positive Results for Approximate Equilibria. In light of the above results, in Sec-
tion 4, we turn our attention to identifying environments with more structure or
flexibility with respect to the underlying solution concept, for which we can hope for
improved quality of equilibria. Both our lower bound constructions discussed above
use players’ weights that form a geometric sequence. In particular the ratio W of
the largest over the smallest weight is equal to wn (for some w > 1), which grows
very large as the number of players n→∞. On the other hand, for games where the
players have equal weights, i.e. W = 1, we know that the PoS is at most d+ 1. It is
therefore natural to ask how the performance of the good equilibria captured by the
notion of PoS varies with respect to W . In Theorem 4.4, we are able to give a general
upper bound for α-approximate equilibria which is sensitive to this parameter W and
to α. This general theorem has two immediate, interesting corollaries.
Firstly (Corollary 4.5), by allowing the ratio W to range in [1,∞), we derive the
existence of an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium with PoS at most (d+ 3)/2; the
equilibrium’s approximation parameter α ranges from Θ(1) to d+ 1 in a smooth way
with respect to W . This is of particular importance in settings where player weights
are not very far away from each other (that is, W is small). Secondly (Corollary 4.6),
by setting W = 1 and allowing α to range up to d + 1, we get an upper bound of
d+1
α for the α-approximate PoS of unweighted congestion games which, to the best of
our knowledge, was not known before, degrading gracefully from d + 1 (which is the
actual PoS of exact equilibria in the unweighted case [17]) down to the optimal value
of 1 if we allow (d+ 1)-approximate equilibria (which in fact can be achieved by the
optimum solution itself; see Theorem D.1).
Our Techniques. An advantage of our main lower bound (Theorem 3.1) is the
simplicity of the underlying construction, as well as its straightforward adaptation to
network games (see Subsection 3.1.1)). However, fine-tuning the parameters of the
game (player weights and latency functions), to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium
at the “bad” instance, was a technically involved task. This was in part due to the
fact that, in order to guarantee uniqueness (via iteratively dominant strategies), each
player interacts with a window of µ other players. This µ depends on d in a delicate
way (see Figure 3.1 and Lemma 3.2); it has to be an integer but, at the same time,
needs also to balance nicely with the algebraic properties of Φd.
Moreover we needed to provide deeper insights on the asymptotic, analytic be-
haviour of Φd, and to explore some new algebraic characteristics of Φd (see, e.g.,
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Lemma A.3). It is important to keep in mind that asymptotically Φd ∼ dln d (see (A.6)).
The fact that Φd = Θ
(
d
ln d
)
was already known by the work of Aland et al. [3]; here we
provide a more refined characterization of Φd’s growth, using the Lambert-W function
(see (A.7)).
In order to derive our upper bounds, we need to define a novel approximate po-
tential function [16, 20, 32]. First, in Lemma 4.1, we identify clear algebraic sufficient
conditions for the existence of approximate equilibria with good social-cost guaran-
tees, and then explicitly define (see (4.4) and (4.10) in the proof of Theorem 4.4) a
function that satisfies them. This continuous function, which is defined in the entire
space of positive reals, essentially generalizes that of Rosenthal’s in a smooth way: by
setting W = α = 1, we recover exactly the first significant terms of the well known
Rosenthal potential [46] polynomial, with which one can demonstrate the usual PoS
results for the unweighted case (see, e.g. [19]). The simple, analytic way in which this
function is defined, is the very reason why we can handle both the approximation
parameter α of the equilibrium and the ratio W of the weights in a smooth manner
while at the same time providing good PoS guarantees.
It is important to stress that, by the purely analytical way in which our approx-
imate potential function is defined, in principle it can also incorporate more general
cost functions than polynomials; so, we believe that this technique may be of inde-
pendent interest. We point towards that direction in Appendix C.
2. Model and Notation. Let R denote the set of real numbers, R≥0 = [0,∞)
and R>0 = (0,∞).
Weighted Congestion Games. A weighted congestion game consists of a finite,
nonempty set of players N and resources (or facilities) E. Each player i ∈ N has a
weight wi ∈ R>0 and a strategy set Si ⊆ 2E . Associated with each resource e ∈ E
is a cost (or latency) function ce : R>0 −→ R≥0. In this paper we mainly focus on
polynomial cost functions with maximum degree d ≥ 0 and nonnegative coefficients;
that is, every cost function is of the form ce(x) =
∑d
j=0 ae,j · xj , with ae,j ≥ 0 for
all j. In the following, whenever we refer to polynomial cost functions we mean cost
functions of this particular form.
A pure strategy profile is a choice of strategies s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) ∈ S = S1×· · ·×
Sn by the players. We use the standard game-theoretic notation s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1,
si+1, . . . sn), S−i = S1 × · · · × Si−1 × Si+1 × · · · × Sn, such that s = (si, s−i). Given a
pure strategy profile s, we define the load xe(s) of resource e ∈ E as the total weight
of players that use resource e on s, i.e., xe(s) =
∑
i∈N :e∈si wi. The cost player i is
defined by Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si ce(xe(s)).
A singleton weighted congestion game is a special form of congestion games where
the strategies of all players consist only of single resources; that is, for all players i ∈ N ,
|si| = 1 for all si ∈ Si. In a weighted network congestion games the resources E are
given as the edge set of some directed graph G = (V,E), and each player i ∈ N has
a source oi ∈ V and destination ti ∈ V node; then, the strategy set Si of each player
is implicitly given as the edge sets of all directed oi → ti paths in G.
Nash Equilibria. A pure strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only
if for every player i ∈ N and for all s′i ∈ Si, we have Ci(s) ≤ Ci(s′i, s−i). Similarly a
strategy profile is an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, for α ≥ 1, if Ci(s) ≤ α ·
Ci(s
′
i, s−i) for all players i ∈ N and s′i ∈ Si. As discussed in the introduction, weighted
congestion games do not always admit pure Nash equilibria. However, by Nash’s
theorem they have mixed Nash equilibria. A tuple σ = (σ1, · · · , σN ) of independent
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probability distributions over players’ strategy sets is a mixed Nash equilibrium if
E
s∼σ[Ci(s)] ≤ Es−i∼σ−i[Ci(s
′
i, s−i)]
holds for every i ∈ N and s′i ∈ Si. Here σ−i is a product distribution of all σj ’s with
j 6= i, and s−i denotes a strategy profile drawn from this distribution. We use NE(G)
to denote the set of all mixed Nash equilibria of a game G.
Social Cost and Price of Stability. Fix a weighted congestion game G. The social
cost of a pure strategy profile s is the weighted sum of the players’ costs
C(s) =
∑
i∈N
wi · Ci(s) =
∑
e∈E
xe(s) · ce(xe(s)).
Denote by OPT(G) = mins∈S C(s) the optimum social cost over all strategy profiles
s ∈ S. Then, the Price of Stability (PoS) of G is the social cost of the best-case Nash
equilibrium over the optimum social cost:
PoS(G) = min
σ∈NE(G)
Es∼σ[C(s)]
OPT(G)
.
The Price of Stability of α-approximate Nash equilibria is defined accordingly. The
PoS for a class G of games is the worst (i.e., largest) PoS among all games in the class,
that is, PoS(G) = supG∈G PoS(G). For example, our focus in this paper is determining
the Price of Stability for the class G of weighted congestion games with polynomial
cost functions.
For brevity, we will sometimes abuse our formal terminology and refer to the “PoS
of s” for a specific (approximate) equilibrium s of a game G (see, e.g., Theorem 4.4);
by that we will mean the approximation ratio of the social cost of s to the optimum,
i.e., C(s)OPT(G) . Clearly, the PoS of any such equilibrium s is a valid upper bound to the
PoS of the entire game G.
Finally, notice that, by using a straightforward scaling argument, it is without
loss with respect to the PoS metric to analyse games with player weights in [1,∞); if
not, divide all wi’s with mini wi and scale cost functions accordingly.
3. Lower Bounds. In this section, we present our lower bound constructions.
In Subsection 3.1 we present the general lower bound and then in Subsection 3.2 the
lower bound for singleton games.
3.1. General Congestion Games. The next theorem presents our main neg-
ative result on the Price of Stability of weighted congestion games with polynomial
latencies of degree d, that almost matches the Price of Anarchy upper bound of Φd+1d
from Aland et al. [3]. Our result shows a strong separation for the Price of Stability
between weighted and unweighted congestion games; the Price of Stability of the lat-
ter is at most d + 1 [17]. This is in sharp contrast to the Price of Anarchy of these
two classes, where the respective bounds are essentially the same.
To state our result, we first introduce some notation. Let Φd ∼ dln d be the unique
positive root of equation (x + 1)d = xd+1 and let βd be a parameter with βd ≥ 0.38
for any d, limd→∞ βd = 12 (formally, βd is defined in (3.2) below, and a plot of its
values can be seen in Figure 3.1).
Theorem 3.1. The Price of Stability of weighted congestion games with polyno-
mial latency functions of degree at most d ≥ 9 is at least (βdΦd)d+1.
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Fig. 3.1. The values of parameters βb and cd in Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.1, for d =
9, 10, . . . , 100.
We must mention here that the restriction of d ≥ 9 is without loss: for polynomial
latencies of smaller degrees d ≤ 8 we can instead apply the simpler lower-bound
instance for singleton games given in Subsection 3.2. To prove the theorem, we will
need the following technical lemma. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3.2. For any positive integer d define
(3.1) cd =
1
d
⌊
d
ln(2 · Φd + 1)− ln(Φd + 1)
ln Φd
⌋
and
(3.2) βd = 1− Φ−cdd .
Then
(3.3) Φd+2d ≤
(
Φd +
1
βd
)d
,
and for all d ≥ 9,
(3.4) d · cd ≥ 3, 0.38 ≤ βd ≤ 1
2
and lim
d→∞
βd =
1
2
.
Plots of parameters cd and βd can be found in Figure 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix some integer d ≥ 9. Our lower bound instance consists
of n+ µ players and n+ µ+ 1 facilities, where µ:=c · d for c = cd defined as in (3.1).
In particular then, due to (3.4) of Lemma 3.2, µ ≥ 3 is an integer. You can think
of n as a very large integer, since at the end we will take n → ∞. Every player
i = 1, 2, . . . , n+ µ has a weight of wi = w
i, where w = 1 + 1Φd .
It will be useful for subsequent computations to notice that
wd =
(
1 +
1
Φd
)d
=
(Φd + 1)
d
Φdd
=
Φd+1d
Φdd
= Φd,
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wd+1 = wd · w = Φd
(
1 +
1
Φd
)
= Φd + 1.
Let us also define
α = α(µ):=
µ∑
j=1
w−j =
1− w−µ
w − 1 =
1− (wd)−c
w − 1 =
1− Φ−cd
1 + 1Φd − 1
= Φd
(
1− Φ−cd
)
= βΦd,
where β = βd is defined as in (3.2). In the following we will make extensive use of the
observation that
w−µ =
(
wd
)−c
= Φ−cd = 1− β.
Furthermore, for every i ≥ µ+ 1
i−1∑
j=i−µ
wj =
µ∑
j=1
wi−j = α · wi and
i∑
j=i−µ
wj = (α+ 1) · wi,
and ∞∑
`=1
w−` =
1
w − 1 =
1
1 + 1Φd − 1
= Φd.
The facilities have latency functions
cj(t) = Φd(1− β)(α+ 1)d, if j = 1, . . . , µ,
cj(t) = w
−j(d+1)td, if j = µ+ 1, . . . , µ+ n,
cn+µ+1(t) = 0.
Every player i has two available strategies, s∗i and s˜i. Eventually we will show
that the profile s∗ corresponds to the optimal solution, while s˜ corresponds to the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Informally, at the former the player chooses
to stay at her “own” i-th facility, while at the latter she chooses to deviate and play
the µ following facilities i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ. However, special care shall be taken for the
boundary cases of the first µ and last µ players, so for any player i we formally define
Si = {s∗i , s˜i} where s∗i = {i} and
s˜i =

{µ+ 1, . . . , µ+ i}, if i = 1, . . . , µ,
{i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ}, if i = µ+ 1, . . . , n,
{i+ 1, . . . , n+ µ+ 1}, if i = n+ 1, . . . , n+ µ.
These two outcomes, s∗ and s˜, are shown in Figure 3.2.
Notice here that any facility j cannot get a load greater than the sum of the
weights of the previous µ players plus the weight of the j-th player. So, for and any
strategy profile s:
(3.5) xj(s) ≤
j∑
`=j−µ
w` = (α+ 1)w
j for all j ≥ µ+ 1
Next we will show that the strategy profile s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜n+µ) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of our congestion game. We do that by proving that
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Fig. 3.2. The social optimum s∗ and the unique Nash equilibrium s˜ in the lower bound con-
struction of Theorem 3.1 for general weighted congestion games.
1. It is a strongly dominant strategy for any player i = 1, . . . , µ to play s˜i.
2. For any i = µ + 1, . . . , n + µ, given that every player k < i has chosen to
play s˜k, then it is a strongly dominant strategy for player i to deviate to s˜i
as well.
For the first condition, fix some player i ≤ µ and a strategy profile s−i for the
other players and observe that by choosing s˜i, player i incurs a cost of at most
Ci(s˜i, s−i) =
∑
j∈s˜i
cj(xj(s˜i)) ≤
µ+i∑
`=µ+1
c`
(
(α+ 1)w`
)
=
µ+i∑
`=µ+1
w−`(d+1)(α+ 1)dw`d = (α+ 1)d
µ+i∑
`=µ+1
w−`
< (α+ 1)d · w−µ ·
∞∑
`=1
w−` = (α+ 1)d · (1− β) · Φd
= Ci(s
∗
i , s−i),
where in the first inequality we used the bound from (3.5).
For the second condition, we will consider the deviations of the remaining players.
Fix now some i = µ+ 1, . . . , n and assume a strategy profile s−i = (s˜1, . . . , s˜i−1, si+1,
. . . , sn+µ) for the remaining players
3. If player i chooses strategy s∗i she will experience
a cost of
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) = ci
 i∑
`=i−µ
w`
 = ci ((α+ 1)wi) = w−i(d+1)(α+ 1)dwid = (α+ 1)dw−i.
It remains to show that
(3.6) Ci(s˜i, s−i) < Ci(s∗i , s−i) = (α+ 1)
dw−i.
3For the remaining last µ players i = n + 1, . . . , n + µ the proof is similar, and as a matter of
fact easier, since when these players deviate to s˜i they also use the final “dummy” facility n+ µ+ 1
that has zero cost.
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i i+ 1 k − 1 k k + 1 i+ µ− 1 i+ µ
NASH OPT NASH or OPT
Fig. 3.3. The format of profile s′−i described in Claim 3.3 and returned as output from Procedure
Dominate(s−i, i) (see Appendix A.3). All players i + 1, . . . , i + µ (i.e., those who lie within the
window of interest of player i, depicted in grey) play according to the Nash equilibrium s˜, except the
last player i+ µ (that plays according to the optimal profile s∗) and at most one other k (that may
play either s˜k or s
∗
k).
The cost Ci(s˜i, s−i) is complicated to bound immediately, for any profile s−i.
Instead, we will resort to the following claim which characterizes the profile s−i where
this cost is maximized, as shown in Figure 3.3. Its proof can be found in Appendix A.3.
Claim 3.3. There exists a profile s′−i with
1. s′j = sj for all j < i and j > i+ µ
2. s′i+µ = s
∗
i+µ
3. there exists some k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ− 1} such that
s′j = s˜j for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ− 1} \ {k},
that dominates s−i, i.e.
(3.7) Ci(s˜i, s−i) ≤ Ci(s˜i, s′−i).
By use of Claim 3.3, it remains to show
(3.8) Ci(s˜i, s
′
−i) < (α+ 1)
dw−i,
just for the special case of profiles s′ that are described in Claim 3.3 and also shown
in Figure 3.3. We do this in Appendix A.4.
Summarizing, we proved that indeed s˜ is the unique Nash equilibrium of our
congestion game. Finally, to conclude with lower-bounding the Price of Stability, let
us compute the social cost on profiles s˜ and s∗. On s∗, any facility j (except the last
one) gets a load equal to the weight of player j, so
C(s∗) =
n+µ∑
j=1
wjcj(wj)
=
µ∑
j=1
wjΦd(1− β)(α+ 1)d +
n+µ∑
j=µ+1
wjw−j(d+1)(wj)d
= Φd(1− β)(α+ 1)d
µ∑
j=1
wj +
µ+n∑
j=µ+1
1
= Φd(1− β)(α+ 1)dww
µ − 1
w − 1 + n
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u1
u2
uµ
uµ+1 uµ+2 uµ+3 uµ+n+1 uµ+n+2
1
2
µ
µ+ 1 µ+ 2 n+ µ+ 1· · ·
...
a b ⇒ a b
Fig. 3.4. Transformation of the lower bound instance of Theorem 3.1 for general weighted
congestion games to a network game, as described in Proposition 3.4.
= Φd(1− β)(α+ 1)d
(
1 +
1
Φd
) 1
1−β − 1
1 + 1Φd − 1
+ n
= Φd(1− β)(α+ 1)d(Φd + 1) β
1− β + n
≤ n+ Φd(Φd + 1)β(α+ 1)d.
On the other hand, at the unique Nash equilibrium s˜ each facility j ≥ µ+ 1 receives
a load equal to the sum of the weights of the previous µ players, i.e.
xj(s˜) =
j−1∑
`=j−µ
w` = αw
j
so
C(s˜) ≥
n+µ∑
j=µ+1
xj(s˜)cj(xj(s˜)) =
n+µ∑
j=µ+1
w−j(d+1)
(
αwj
)d+1
= αd+1
µ+n∑
j=µ+1
1 = αd+1n.
By taking n arbitrarily large we get a lower bound on the Price of Stability of
lim
n→∞
C(s˜)
C(s∗)
≥ lim
n→∞
αd+1n
n+ Φd(Φd + 1)β(α+ 1)d
= αd+1 = (βΦd)
d+1,
where from Lemma 3.2 we know that 13 ≤ β = 12 − o(1).
3.1.1. Network Games. Due to the rather simple structure of the players’
strategy sets in the lower bound construction of Theorem 3.1, it can be readily ex-
tended to network games as well:
Proposition 3.4. Theorem 3.1 applies also to network weighted congestion games.
Proof. We arrange the resources from the instance in the proof of Theorem 3.1 as
edges in a graph as depicted in Figure 3.4. In particular, for all j = µ+1, . . . , n+µ+1,
resource j from Theorem 3.1 corresponds to edge (uj , uj+1). For the special case of
the first µ resources, for j = 1, . . . , µ, we represent resource j by the directed edge
(uµ+1, uj).
Regarding strategies, recall from the instance used in the proof of Theorem 3.1
that, for each i = µ, . . . , n, player i has two available strategies: resource {i} or
resources {i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ}. To map this to our network instance, we set the source
node oi of player i to be oi = ui+1 and introduce a new destination node ti connected
to the rest of the graph by zero-latency directed edges (ui, ti) and (ui+µ+1, ti). In
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that way, strategy {i} of Theorem 3.1 corresponds to the path oi = ui+1 → ui → ti
of our graph, while strategy {i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ} to path oi = ui+1 → ui+2 → · · · →
ui+µ+1 → ti. To avoid clutter, these destination nodes ti and the corresponding
zero-latency edges are not depicted in Figure 3.4. In an analogous way, we can set
the sources and destinations of the remaining first i = 1, . . . , µ − 1 and last i =
n+1, . . . , n+µ+1 players, taking into consideration their specially restricted strategy
sets in the construction of the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Summarizing, each player i ∈ [1, n+µ] has to route its traffic from oi to ti, where
oi =
{
uµ+1, if i = 1, . . . , µ,
ui+1, if i = µ+ 1, . . . , n+ µ,
and nodes ti are connected with zero latency edges as follows:
• For each i ∈ [1, n+ µ] there is a directed zero cost edge from ui to ti.
• For each i ∈ [1, n] there is a directed zero cost edge from uµ+1+i to ti.
• For each i ∈ [n+ 1, n+ µ] there is a directed zero cost edge from uµ+n+2 to
ti.
Then, by construction, each player i has two available oi → ti paths, which correspond
directly to strategy sets s∗i and s˜i used in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
There is one issue left to complete our network game construction: we have not
yet set a direction on some of our edges, namely (ui, ui+1) for i = µ+ 1, . . . , n+µ+ 1
which are depicted also as undirected edges in Figure 3.4. This is due to the fact
that, by our construction so far, these edges can be used in both directions: by player
i (left-to-right) or player i + 1 (right-to-left). Thus, to turn our instance to a valid
directed network, we need to replace such edges with a “gadget” that essentially forces
both players, no matter from which direction they enter the edge, to use it in the same
direction and both contribute to its load. This can be achieved by using the structure
depicted in the bottom right corner of Figure 3.4.
3.2. Singleton Games. In this section we give an exponential lower bound for
singleton weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions. The follow-
ing theorem handles also approximate equilibria and provides a lower bound on the
Price of Stability in a very strong sense; even if one allows for the best approximate
equilibrium with approximation factor α = o
(
d
ln d
)
, then its cost is lower-bounded
by ω(poly(d)) times the optimal cost.4 In other words, in order to achieve poly-
nomial (with respect to d) guarantees on the Price of Stability, one has to consider
Ω
(
d
ln d
)
-approximate equilibria—almost linear in d; this shows that our positive result
in Corollary 4.5, of the following Subsection 4.3, is almost tight. This is furthermore
complemented by Theorem D.1, where we show that the socially optimum profile is
a (d+ 1)-approximate equilibrium (achieving an optimal Price of Stability of 1).
Theorem 3.5. For any positive integer d and any real α ∈ [1, d), the α-approximate
(mixed) Price of Stability of weighted (singleton) congestion games with polynomial
latencies of degree at most d is at least
(3.9)
1
e(d+ 1)
(
1 +
1
α
)d+1
.
In particular, for the special case of α = 1, we derive that the Price of Stability of
exact equilibria is Ω(2d/d).
4 To see this, just take any upper bound of d+1
c ln(d+1)
on α, for a constant c > 2. Then, the lower
bound in (3.9) becomes Ω(dc−1).
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Fig. 3.5. The social optimum s∗ and the unique α-approximate equilibrium s˜ in the lower bound
construction of Theorem 3.5 for singleton weighted congestion games.
Proof. Fix a positive integer d and the desired approximation parameter α ∈
[1, d). Also, let γ ∈ (α, d) be a parameter arbitrarily close to α. Our instance consists
of n players with weights wi = w
i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where we set
(3.10) w = γ
d+ 1
d− γ > γ,
the inequality holding due to the fact that d + 1 > d − γ > 0. At the end of our
construction we will take n→∞, so one can think of n as a very large integer. There
are n+ 1 facilities with latency functions
c1(t) = γw
d(w + 1)d,
cj(t) = (γw
d)2−j · td, j = 2, . . . , n,
cn+1(t) = γ
1−nwd(w + 1)d.
Any player i has exactly two strategies, s∗i = {i} and s˜i = {i + 1} i.e., Si =
{{i}, {i+ 1}} for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let s∗, s˜ be the strategy profiles where every player
i plays s∗i , s˜i respectively. These two outcomes, s
∗ and s˜ are depicted in Figure 3.5.
One should think of s∗ as the socially optimal profile. We will show that s˜ is the unique
α-approximate Nash equilibrium of our game. To ensure this, it suffices to require
the following, which corresponds to eliminating all other possible strictly dominated
α-approximate equilibria:
1. It is a strictly α-dominant strategy for player 1 to use facility 2, i.e.
αC1(s˜1, s−i) < C1(s)
for any profile s.
2. For any i = 2, . . . , n, if every player k < i has chosen facility k + 1 then it is
a strictly α-dominant strategy for player i to chose facility i+ 1, i.e.
αCi(s˜1, . . . , s˜i−1, s˜i, si+1, . . . , sn) < Ci(s˜1, . . . , s˜i−1, si, si+1, . . . , sn)
for any strategies (si, si+1, . . . , sn) ∈ Si × · · · × Sn.
For the first condition, since facility 2 can be used by at most players 1 and 2,
and γ > α, it is enough to show that γc2(w1 + w2) ≤ c1(w1). Indeed
γc2(w1 + w2) = γ(γw
d)2−2(w + w2)d = γwd(1 + w)d = c1(w1).
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Similarly, for the second condition, it suffices to show that γci+1(wi + wi+1) ≤
ci(wi−1 + wi) for i = 2, . . . , n − 1, and γcn+1(wn) ≤ cn(wn−1 + wn) for the special
case of i = n. This is because, facility i+1 can be used by at most players i and i+1,
while facility i is already being used by player i− 1. Indeed, for any i = 2, . . . , n− 1
we see that:
γci+1(wi + wi+1) = γ(γw
d)2−(i+1)(wi + wi+1)d = (γwd)2−i(wi−1 + wi)d
= ci(wi−1 + wi),
while for i = n,
cn(wn−1 + wn) = (γwd)2−n(wn−1 + wn)d
= γ2−nwd(2−n)+d(n−1)(w + 1)d
= γ · γ1−nwd(w + 1)d
= γcn+1(wn).
The social cost at equilibrium s˜ is at least the cost of player n at s˜, that is,
C(s˜) ≥ wncn+1(wn) = wn · γ1−nwd(1 + w)d =
(
w
γ
)n
γ · wd(1 + w)d
On the other hand, consider the strategy profile s∗ where every player i chooses facility
i:
C(s∗) = w1c1(w1) +
n∑
i=2
wici(wi)
= γwd+1(1 + w)d +
n∑
i=2
wi(γwd)2−iwid
= γwd+1(1 + w)d + γ2w2d
n∑
i=2
(
w
γ
)i
= γwd+1(1 + w)d + γ2w2d ·
(
w
γ
)2 (w
γ
)n−1
− 1
w
γ − 1
≤ γwd+1(1 + w)d + γ2w2d ·
(
w
γ
)2 (w
γ
)n−1
w
γ − 1
=
(
w
γ
)n
γ ·
[(
w
γ
)−n
· wd+1(w + 1)d + w
2d+1
w
γ − 1
]
Recall now that, from (3.10), wγ > 1, and thus limn→∞
(
w
γ
)−n
= 0. So, as the
number of players n grows large we get the following lower bound on the Price of
Stability:
lim
n→∞
C(s˜)
C(s∗)
≥ lim
n→∞
wd(1 + w)d(
w
γ
)−n
· wd+1(w + 1)d + w2d+1w
γ −1
=
(
w
γ
− 1
)
(1 + w)d
wd+1
.
THE PRICE OF STABILITY OF WEIGHTED CONGESTION GAMES 15
Since γ is chosen arbitrarily close to α, deploying (3.10) to substitute w, the above
lower bound can be written as
lim
n→∞
C(s˜)
C(s∗)
≥
(
d+ 1
d− α − 1
)[
1 +
α(d+ 1)
d− α
]d
/
[
α(d+ 1)
d− α
]d+1
=
(
α+ 1
d− α
)[
d(α+ 1)
d− α
]d
/
[
α(d+ 1)
d− α
]d+1
=
(α+ 1)d+1dd
αd+1(d+ 1)d+1
=
1
d+ 1
(
1− 1
d+ 1
)d(
1 +
1
α
)d+1
≥ 1
e
1
d+ 1
(
1 +
1
α
)d+1
.
4. Upper Bounds. The negative results of the previous sections involve con-
structions where the ratio W of the largest to smallest weight can be exponential in
d. In the main theorem (Theorem 4.4) of this section we present an analysis which is
sensitive to this parameter W , and identify conditions under which the performance
of approximate equilibria can be significantly improved.
Our upper bound approach is based on the design of a suitable approximate
potential function and has three main steps. First, in Subsection 4.1, we set up a
framework for the definition of this function by identifying conditions that, on the
one hand, certify the existence of an approximate equilibrium and, on the other,
provide guarantees about its efficiency. Then, in Subsection 4.2, by use of the Euler-
Maclaurin summation formula we present a general form of an approximate potential
function, which extends Rosenthal’s potential for weighted congestion games (see
also Appendix C). Finally, in Subsection 4.3, we deploy this potential for polynomial
latencies. Due to its analytic description, our potential differs from other extensions
of the Rosenthal’s potential that have appeared in previous work, and we believe that
this contribution might be of independent interest, and applied to other classes of
latency functions.
4.1. The Potential Method. In the next lemma we lay the ground for the de-
sign and analysis of approximate potential functions, by supplying conditions that not
only provide guarantees for the existence of approximate equilibria, but also for their
performance with respect to the social optimum. In the premises of the lemma, we give
conditions on the resource functions φe, having in mind that Φ(s) =
∑
e∈E φe(xe(s))
will eventually serve as the “approximate” potential function.
Lemma 4.1. Consider a weighted congestion game with latency functions ce, for
each facility e ∈ E, and player weights wi, for each player i ∈ N . If there exist
functions φe : R≥0 −→ R and parameters α1, α2, β1, β2 > 0 such that for any facility
e and player weight w ∈ {w1, . . . , wn}
(4.1) α1 ≤ φe(x+ w)− φe(x)
w · ce(x+ w) ≤ α2, for all x ≥ 0,
and
(4.2) β1 ≤ φe(x)
x · ce(x) ≤ β2, for all x ≥ minn wn,
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then our game has an α2α1 -approximate pure Nash equilibrium which, furthermore, has
Price of Stability at most β2β1 .
Proof. Denote α = α2α1 , β =
β2
β1
. First we will show that the function Φ(s) =∑
e∈E φe(xe(s)) (defined over all feasible outcomes s) is an α-approximate potential,
i.e. for any profile s, any player i and strategy s′i ∈ Si,
Ci(s
′
i, s−i) <
1
α
Ci(s) =⇒ Φ(s′i, s−i) < Φ(s).
This would be sufficient to establish the existence of a pure α-approximate equilibrium,
since any (local) minimizer of Φ will do. So, it is enough to prove that
Φ(s′i, s−i)− Φ(s) ≤ wiα1 [α · Ci(s′i, s−i)− Ci(s)] .
Indeed, if for simplicity we denote xe = xe(s) and x
′
e = xe(s
′
i, s−i) for all facilities e,
we can compute
Φ(s′i, s−i)− Φ(s) =
∑
e∈E
[φe(x
′
e)− φe(xe)]
=
∑
e∈s′i\si
[φe(xe + wi)− φe(xe)] +
∑
e∈si\s′i
[φe(xe − wi)− φe(xe)]
≤ α2
∑
e∈s′i\si
wice(xe + wi)− α1
∑
e∈si\s′i
wice(xe)
≤ wiα2
 ∑
e∈s′i\si
ce(xe + wi) +
∑
e∈s′i∩si
ce(xe)

− wiα1
 ∑
e∈si\s′i
ce(xe) +
∑
e∈s′i∩si
ce(xe)

= wiα1
α
 ∑
e∈s′i\si
ce(xe + wi) +
∑
e∈s′i∩si
ce(xe)

−
 ∑
e∈si\s′i
ce(xe) +
∑
e∈s′i∩si
ce(xe)

= wiα1 [αCi(s
′
i, s−i)− Ci(s)] .
where the first inequality holds due to (4.1) and the second one because α2 ≥ α1.
Next, for the upper bound of β on the Price of Stability, it is enough to show that
for any profiles s, s′,
Φ(s) ≤ Φ(s′) =⇒ C(s) ≤ β · C(s′),
because then, if s∗ ∈ argmins C(s) is an optimal-cost profile and s˜ ∈ argmins Φ(s) is a
global minimizer of Φ, then C(s˜) ≤ βC(s∗) (and furthermore, as a minimizer of Φ, s˜ is
clearly an α-approximate equilibrium as well; see the first part of the current proof).
Indeed, denoting xe = xe(s), x
′
e = xe(s
′) for simplicity, we have:
Φ(s′)− Φ(s) =
∑
e∈E
φe(x
′
e)−
∑
e∈E
φe(xe)
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≤ β2
∑
e∈E
x′ece(x
′
e)− β1
∑
e∈E
xece(xe)
= β2C(s
′)− β1C(s)
= β1 (βC(s
′)− C(s)) ,
where for the first inequality we deployed (4.2).
4.2. Faulhaber’s Potential. In this section we propose an approximate poten-
tial function, which is based on the following classic number-theoretic result, known
as Faulhaber’s formula5, which states that for any positive integers n,m,
n∑
k=1
km =
1
m+ 1
m∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
m+ 1
j
)
Bjn
m+1−j
=
1
m+ 1
nm+1 +
1
2
nm +
1
m+ 1
m∑
j=2
(
m+ 1
j
)
Bjn
m+1−j ,(4.3)
where the coefficients Bj are the usual Bernoulli numbers.
6 In particular, this shows
that the sum of the first n powers with exponent m can be expressed as a polynomial
of n with degree m+1. Furthermore, this sum corresponds to the well-known potential
of Rosenthal [46] for unweighted congestion games when the latency function is the
monomial x 7→ xm.
Based on the above observation, we go beyond just integer values of n, and
generalize this idea to all positive reals; in that way, we design a “potential” function
that can handle different player weights and, furthermore, incorporate in a more
powerful, analytically smooth way, approximation factors with respect to both the
Price of Stability, as well as the approximation parameter of the equilibrium (in the
spirit of Lemma 4.1). A natural way to do that is to directly generalize (4.3) and
simply define, for any real x ≥ 0 and positive integer m,
(4.4) Sm(x):=
1
m+ 1
xm+1 +
1
2
xm,
keeping just the first two significant terms.7 For the special case of m = 0 we set
S0(y):=y.
For any positive integer m we define the function Am : [1,∞) −→ R>0 with
(4.5) Am(x):=
[
Sm(x)
xm+1
]−1
=
(
1
m+ 1
+
1
2x
)−1
=
2(m+ 1)x
2x+m+ 1
;
for m = 0 in particular, this gives A0(x)=1. Observe that Am is strictly increasing
(in x) for all m ≥ 1,
(4.6) Am(1) =
2(m+ 1)
m+ 3
∈ [1, 2), and lim
x→∞Am(x) = m+ 1.
For the special case of m = 0 we simply have A0(x) = 1 for all x ≥ 0. Figure 4.1
5See, e.g., [37, p. 287] or [22, p. 106]). Johann Faulhaber [25] was the first to discover the formula
and express it in a systematic way, up to the power of m = 17. Jakob Bernoulli was able to state
it in its full generality as his famous Summæ Potestatum [7, p. 97], by introducing what are now
known as Bernoulli numbers (see also Footnote 6). The first to rigorously prove the formula was
Carl Jacobi [36].
6See, e.g., [31, Chapter 6.5] or [1, Chapter 23]. The first Bernoulli numbers are: B0 = 1, B1 =
−1/2, B2 = 1/6, B3 = 0, B4 = −1/30, . . . . Also, we know that Bj = 0 for all odd integers j ≥ 3.
7See Subsection 4.4 for further discussion on this choice.
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Fig. 4.1. Plots of functions Ad for d = 0, 1, 2 (left) and d = 40 (right). For d ≥ 1 they are
strictly increasing, starting at Ad(1) =
2(d+1)
d+3
∈ [1, 2) and going up to d + 1 at the limit. Here,
A0(1) = 1, A1(1) = 1, A2(1) = 6/5 = 1.2 and A40(1) = 82/43 ≈ 1.907.
shows a graph of these functions. Since Am is strictly increasing for m ≥ 1, its inverse
function, A−1m : [2
m+1
m+3 ,m + 1) −→ [1,∞), is well-defined and also strictly increasing
for all m ≥ 1, with
(4.7) A−1m (x) =
(m+ 1)x
2(m+ 1− x) .
The following two lemmas (whose proofs can be found in Appendices B.2 and B.3)
describe some useful properties regarding the algebraic behaviour, and the relation
among, functions Am and Sm:
Lemma 4.2. Fix any reals y ≥ x ≥ 1. Then the sequences Am(x)m+1 and Am(x)Am(y) are
decreasing, and sequence Am(x) is increasing (with respect to m).
Lemma 4.3. Fix any integer m ≥ 0 and reals γ,w ≥ 1. Then
(4.8)
γm+1
Am(γw)
≤ Sm(γ(x+ w))− Sm(γx)
w(x+ w)m
≤ γm+1, for all x ≥ 0,
and
(4.9)
γm+1
m+ 1
≤ Sm(γx)
xm+1
≤ γ
m+1
Am(γ)
, for all x ≥ 1.
4.3. The Upper Bound. Now we are ready to state our main positive result:
Theorem 4.4. At any congestion game with polynomial latency functions of de-
gree at most d ≥ 1 and player weights ranging in [1,W ], for any 2(d+1)W2W+d+1 ≤ α ≤ d+ 1
there exists an α–approximate pure Nash equilibrium that, furthermore, has Price of
Stability at most
1 +
(
d+ 1
α
− 1
)
W.
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Observe that, as the approximation parameter α increases, the Price of Stability
decreases, in a smooth way, from d+32 down to the optimal value of 1. Furthermore,
notice how the interval within which α ranges, shrinks as the range of player weights
W grows; in particular, its left boundary 2(d+1)W2W+d+1 goes from 2
d+1
d+3 = 2 − 4d+3 (for
W = 1) up to d+ 1 (for W →∞).
As a result, Theorem 4.4 has two interesting corollaries, one for α = 2(d+1)W2W+d+1 and
one for W = 1 (unweighted games):
Corollary 4.5. At any congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at
most d ≥ 1 where player weights lie within the range [1,W ], there is an 2(d+1)W2W+d+1 -
approximate pure Nash equilibrium with Price of Stability at most d+32 .
It is interesting to point out here that, in light of Theorem 3.5, the above result of
Corollary 4.5 is almost asymptotically tight as far as the Price of Stability is concerned
(see the discussion preceding Theorem 3.5).
Corollary 4.6. At any unweighted congestion game with polynomial latencies
of degree at most d ≥ 1, the Price of Stability of α-approximate equilibria is at most
d+1
α , for any 2
d+1
d+3 ≤ α ≤ d+ 1.
Before proving Theorem 4.4, we first restate it in the following equivalent form,
that parametrizes the approximation factor of the equilibrium, as well as its Price of
Stability guarantee, with respect to an “external”, seemingly artificial parameter γ ∈
[1,∞). The equivalence of the two formulations is formally proven in Appendix B.4.
Claim 4.7 (Restatement of Theorem 4.4). For any γ ≥ 1 there exists an
Ad(γW )-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, which furthermore has Price of Stabil-
ity at most d+1Ad(γ) , where Ad is the strictly increasing function
8 taking values within
[2d+1d+3 , d+ 1) defined in (4.5).
The statement of Claim 4.7 may at first seem a bit cryptic, compared to Theorem 4.4.
Nevertheless, it brings forth some important aspects of our upper bound construction
that are not immediately obvious from Theorem 4.4. In particular, notice how the
weight range W has no effect in the Price of Stability guarantee in the statement
of Claim 4.7, but appears only in the approximation factor of the equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, as it will become more clear in Subsection 4.4, this formulation provides a
good degree of high-level abstraction that helps with generalizing and improving our
result in certain cases, in a unified way. We believe this is important, since it is a
promising direction for future work (see also the discussion in Appendix C).
Proof of Claim 4.7. Without loss of generality, it is enough to consider only
weighted congestion games with monomial latency functions (of degree at most d);
any polynomial is a sum of monomials, so we can just simulate the polynomial latency
of a facility by introducing monomial-latency facilities for each one of its summands.
More formally, if a facility e has latency function ce(x) =
∑d
j=0 ae,jx
j , with con-
stants ae,0, ae,1, . . . , ae,d ≥ 0, we can replace e by facilities e0, . . . , ed with latencies
cej (x) = ae,jx
j , without any change to the costs of the players. Furthermore, we can
safely ignore all such facilities ej with ae,j = 0, since they have absolutely no effect in
the players’ costs.
So, from now on assume that for each facility e ∈ E there exists a real constant
8See Figure 4.1.
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ae > 0 and an nonnegative integer me ≤ d such that
ce(x) = aex
me .
Then, in order to utilize Lemma 4.1, we choose functions
(4.10) φe(x) = ae · Sme(γx),
were γ is a real parameter, free to range in [1,∞). Recall here that functions Sm
and Am are defined in (4.4) and (4.5). To simplify notation, from now on we fix an
arbitrary facility e and drop the e-subscripts from φe, ce, ae and me.
From (4.8) of Lemma 4.3 we get that, for any x ≥ 0 and w ∈ [1,W ],
γm+1
Am(γw)
≤ φ(x+ w)− φ(x)
w · c(x+ w) =
a [Sm(γ(x+ w))− Sm(γx)]
w · a · (x+ w)m ≤ γ
m+1.
Similarly, from (4.9) we have that for any x ≥ 1,
γm+1
m+ 1
≤ φ(x)
x · c(x) =
a · Sm(γx)
x · a · xm =
Sm(γx)
xm+1
≤ γ
m+1
Am(γ)
.
Now let us just scale the functions φe we defined in (4.10) by a factor of
1
Sm(γ)
and define a potential function
φ¯(x) =
φ(x)
Sm(γ)
=
Am(γ)
γm+1
· φ(x) = aAm(γ)
γm+1
Sm(γx).
Our previous bounds for φ show us that φ¯ satisfies the requirements of Lemma 4.1
with parameters
α1 =
γm+1
Am(γw)
· Am(γ)
γm+1
=
Am(γ)
Am(γw)
≥ Ad(γ)
Ad(γw)
≥ Ad(γ)
Ad(γW )
α2 = γ
m+1 · Am(γ)
γm+1
= Am(γ) ≤ Ad(γ)
β1 =
γm+1
m+ 1
· Am(γ)
γm+1
=
Am(γ)
m+ 1
≥ Ad(γ)
d+ 1
β2 =
γm+1
Am(γ)
· Am(γ)
γm+1
= 1,
where the inequalities hold due to Lemma 4.2, taking into consideration the fact that
γw ≥ γ ≥ 1 and m ≤ d; specifically for the last inequality on the bound of α1 we also
used the fact that Ad is monotonically increasing.
Putting everything together, from Lemma 4.1 we deduce that indeed there exists
an Ad(γW )–approximate pure Nash equilibrium with Price of Stability at most
d+1
Ad(γ)
.
The fact that Ad(γ) ranges (monotonically) in [2
d+1
d+3 , d+1) is a consequence of (4.6).
4.4. Small vs Large Degree Polynomials. One can argue that our choice
to keep only the first two terms in Faulhaber’s formula (4.3), when defining our
approximate potential in (4.4), is suboptimal. To some extent, this is correct; it is
exactly the reason why this seemingly “unnatural” lower bound of 2d+1d+3 = 2− 4d+3 for
the approximation parameter α appears in Corollary 4.6 (or, more generally, 2(d+1)W2W+d+1
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in Theorem 4.4). It would be nicer if α could simply start from 1 instead. Indeed,
this can be achieved for small values of d, as described below.
Considering the entire right-hand side expression in (4.3), one can take the full,
exact version of Faulhaber’s formula, that can be written9 in a very elegant way as
(4.11)
n∑
k=1
km =
1
m+ 1
[Bm+1(n+ 1)−Bm+1(0)] ,
where
Bm(y) =
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
Bky
m−k, y ≥ 0,
are the Bernoulli polynomials, and coefficients Bk = Bk(0) are the standard Bernoulli
numbers we used before. Now we can use (4.11) to define a more fine-tuned version
for Sm, that is, for m ≥ 1 set Sˆm(x) = 1m+1 [Bm+1(x+ 1)−Bm+1] instead of (4.4).
For example, for degrees up to m ≤ 4 these new polynomials are:
Sˆ0(x) = x, Sˆ1(x) =
1
2
x(x+ 1), Sˆ2(x) =
1
6
x(2x2 + 3x+ 1)
Sˆ3(x) =
1
4
x2(x+ 1)2, Sˆ4(x) =
1
30
x(6x4 + 15x3 + 10x2 − 1)
Using these values, one can verify that for up to m ≤ 4, all our critical technical
requirements for the proof of Claim 4.7 (and thus, Theorem 4.4 itself) are satisfied:
most notably Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, and the monotonicity of Aˆm(x) =
xm+1
Sˆm(x)
(with
respect to x ≥ 1). In particular, now we have that Aˆm(1) = 1m+1Sˆm(1) = 1, which is
exactly what we wanted: it means that the critical quantities Aˆd(γW ) and Aˆd(γ)
in Claim 4.7 can start taking values all the way down to Aˆd(W ) and Aˆd(1) = 1,
respectively. This translates to the approximation ratio parameter α in our main
result in Theorem 4.4 starting to range from α ≥ Aˆd(W ).
Thus,
Theorem 4.4 can be rewritten for d ≤ 4, with the approximation
parameter α taking values in Aˆd(W ) ≤ α ≤ d + 1. In particular,
for unweighted games, this means that Corollary 4.6 can be rewritten
with α taking values within the entire range of [1, d+ 1].
However, there is a catch, that does not allow us to do that in general; as m
grows large, the Bernoulli polynomials, that now play a critical role in our definition
of functions Sˆm (see (4.11)), start to behave in a rather erratic, non-smooth way within
the interior of the real intervals between consecutive integer values. For example, one
can check that, for d = 14 function Aˆ14 is not monotonically increasing within [1, 2].
Even more disastrously, for d = 20, 21 functions Sˆd take negative values in [1, 2] !
Appendix A. Lower Bound Proofs.
A.1. Technical Lemmas.
Lemma A.1. For any d ≥ 9,(
1 +
ln d
d
)d
≥ d
ln d
.
9See, e.g., [37, p. 288] or [1, Eq. 23.1.4].
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Proof. From Mitrinovic´ [42, Eq. (3), p. 267] we know that the following inequality
holds for all n ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ x ≤ n:(
1 +
x
n
)n
≥ ex
(
1− x
2
n
)
.
Applying it with n = d and x = ln d we get that indeed(
1 +
ln d
d
)d
≥ eln d
(
1− ln
2 d
d
)
≥ d 1
ln d
,
the last inequality holding due to the fact that for d ≥ 9, ln2 dd + 1ln d ≤ ln
2(9)
9 +
1
ln(9) ≈
0.992 ≤ 1.
Lemma A.2. For any integer d ≥ 2, the function f : (0,∞)2 −→ (0,∞) defined
by
f(x, y) =
(y + x+ 1)d − (y + x)d
(y + 1)d − yd
is monotonically decreasing with respect to y. Furthermore, for d ≥ 9,
(A.1) ζd+1 ≤ f ((βdΦd + 1)(ζ − 1), βdΦd − (1− βd)ζ) for all ζ ∈ [1, 2],
where βd is defined in Lemma 3.2.
Proof. First let us define function h : (0,∞) −→ (0,∞) with
(A.2) h(t) =
(t+ 1)d − td
(t+ 1)d−1 − td−1 .
We will show that h is increasing, which will suffice to prove the desired monotonicity
of f since its derivative is
∂f(x, y)
∂y
=
d
[
(x+ y + 1)d−1 − (x+ y)d−1]
(y + 1)d − yd
− d
[
(y + 1)d−1 − yd−1] [(x+ y + 1)d − (x+ y)d]
[(y + 1)d − yd]2
=
d
[
(y + 1)d−1 − yd−1] [(x+ y + 1)d−1 − (x+ y)d−1]
[(y + 1)d − yd]2
[h(y)− h(x+ y)] ,
which is negative due to the monotonicity of h. To prove that h is indeed increasing,
we will show something stronger; namely that function h¯ : (1,∞) −→ (0,∞) with
(A.3) h¯(t) =
td − (t− 1)d
td − t(t− 1)d−1
is increasing. This will suffice to demonstrate that h is increasing as well, since
h(t) = (t+ 1) · h¯(t+ 1). Taking its derivative we see that
∂h¯(t)
∂t
=
[
(t− 1)d − td + dtd−1] (t− 1)d
[td+1 − td − t(t− 1)d]2
> 0
since from the convexity of function t 7→ td we know that td − (t− 1)d < dtd−1.
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Now let us prove the remaining part of our lemma, that is (A.1). Observe that if
we set ζ = 1 to (A.1) it is satisfied, since f(0, y) = 1 for any y > 0. So, it is enough
if we prove that
ζ−(d+1)f ((βdΦd + 1)(ζ − 1), βdΦd − (1− βd)ζ) =
ζ−(d+1)
[(α+ β)ζ]
d − [(α+ β)ζ − 1]d
[α+ 1− (1− β)ζ]d − [α− (1− β)ζ]d
is increasing with respect to ζ ∈ [1, 2], where here we are using β = βd and α = βΦd.
So, if we define
f1(ζ) = [(α+ β)ζ]
d − [(α+ β)ζ − 1]d
f2(ζ) = [α+ 1− (1− β)ζ]d − [α− (1− β)ζ]d
and we compute the derivative ∂∂ζ
(
ζ−(d+1) f1(ζ)f2(ζ)
)
of the above expression, we need to
show that
(A.4) ζ
[
f ′1(ζ)
f1(ζ)
− f
′
2(ζ)
f2(ζ)
]
≥ d+ 1.
Now notice that
ζ
f ′1(ζ)
f1(ζ)
= d(α+ β)ζ
[(α+ β)ζ]
d−1 − [(α+ β)ζ − 1]d−1
[(α+ β)ζ]
d − [(α+ β)ζ − 1]d
=
d
h¯ ((α+ β)ζ)
,
where h¯ is the increasing function defined in (A.3), so taking into consideration that
(α+ β)ζ = β(Φd + 1)ζ ≤ 1
2
(Φd + 1)2 ≤ Φd + 1,
we can get that
ζ
f ′1(ζ)
f1(ζ)
≥ d
h¯(Φd + 1)
= d(Φd + 1)
(Φd + 1)
d−1 − Φd−1d
(Φd + 1)d − Φdd
= d
Φd+1d − Φdd − Φd−1d
Φd+1d − Φdd
= d− d
Φ2d − Φd
.
Similarly, we can see that
−ζ f
′
2(ζ)
f2(ζ)
=
d(1− β)ζ
h(α− (1− β)ζ) ,
where h is the increasing function defined in (A.2), so taking into consideration that
α− (1− β)ζ ≤ βΦd − (1− β) ≤ Φd − 1
2
and (1− β)ζ ≥ 1
2
,
we get that
−ζ f
′
2(ζ)
f2(ζ)
≥ d/2
h ((Φd − 1)/2) = d
(Φd + 1)
d−1 − (Φd − 1)d−1
(Φd + 1)d − (Φd − 1)d .
Putting everything together, in order to prove the desired (A.4), it now suffices to
show that
d
(Φd + 1)
d−1 − (Φd − 1)d−1
(Φd + 1)d − (Φd − 1)d −
d
Φ2d − Φd
≥ 1,
which we know holds from (A.5) of Lemma A.3.
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Lemma A.3. For any integer d ≥ 9,
(A.5)
(Φd + 1)
d−1 − (Φd − 1)d−1
(Φd + 1)d − (Φd − 1)d −
1
Φ2d − Φd
≥ 1
d
.
Furthermore, asymptotically Φd ∼ dln d , i.e.
(A.6) lim
d→∞
Φd
d/ ln d
= 1.
In particular, for any integer d,
(A.7) Φd ≤ γd d
ln d
with γd:=
ln d
W(d) ≤ 1.368 and limd→∞ γd = 1,
where W(·) denotes the (principal branch of the) Lambert–W function10.
Proof. To show (A.5), first one can simply numerically verify that it indeed holds
for all integers d = 9, 10, . . . , 17, so let us just focus on the case when d ≥ 18. For
simplicity, in the remainder of the proof we denote y = Φd. It is easy to see
11 then
that
y ≥ Φ18 ≈ 8.11 > 8.
Performing some elementary algebraic manipulations in (A.5), we can equivalently
write it as
(y + 1)d−1
[−y3 + dy2 − (2d− 1)y − d] ≥ (y − 1)d+1(d− y).
Using the fact that (y + 1)d−1 = y
d+1
y+1 , and then that y
d+1 ≥ (y − 1)d+1, we can see
that it is enough to show that
−y3 + dy2 − (2d− 1)y − d ≥ (d− y)(y + 1),
or equivalently,
y2(d− y)− 2dy + y − d ≥ (d− y)(y + 1)
(d− y) [y2 − 1− (y + 1)] ≥ 2dy
(d− y)(y + 1)(y − 2) ≥ 2yd
(y + 1)(y − 2)
2y
≥ 1
1− yd
.(A.8)
For the last inequality we took into consideration that yd < 1. As a matter of fact,
using an upper bound of y ≤ 2dln d on y = Φd (see [3, Lemma 5.4] or (A.7)), we have
that
y
d
≤ 2
ln d
≤ 2
ln(18)
≈ 0.692.
Due to the fact that function z 7→ 11−z is increasing for z ∈ [0, 1), this bound gives us
that 11− yd ≤
1
1−0.69 ≤ 3.226. In a similar way, noticing that function z 7→ (z+1)(z−2)2z
10That is, for any positive real x, W(x) = z gives the unique positive real solution z to the
equation x = z · ez .
11Here we are silently using the fact that Φn is an increasing function of the integer n. One can
formally prove this by, e.g., combining Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 of Aland et al. [3].
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is increasing for z > 2, using the fact that y > 8 we can derive that (y+1)(y−2)2y >
(8+1)(8−2)
2·8 =
27
8 ≈ 3.375. This establishes the validity of (A.8).
Next, we deal with upper-bounding the values of Φd and proving (A.7), since we’ll
need this for establishing the asymptotics of Φd in (A.6). Here we will make use of
the following property, which was shown in Aland et al. [3, Lemma 5.2,Theorem 3.4]:
for any real γ > 0,
(A.9) Φd < γ
d
ln d
⇐⇒
(
1 +
ln d
γd
)d
<
γd
ln d
.
In a similar way to the proof of Aland et al. [3, Theorem 3.4], using a binomial
expansion we can compute:(
1 +
ln d
γd
)d
=
d∑
k=0
(
d
k
)(
ln d
γd
)k
=
d∑
k=0
d!
dk(d− k)!
(
ln d
γ
)k
1
k!
=
d∑
k=0
(
1− 1
d
)(
1− 2
d
)
. . .
(
1− k − 1
d
)(
ln d
γ
)k
1
k!
<
∞∑
k=0
(
ln d
γ
)k
k!
= e
ln d
γ = d1/γ ,
where for the second to last equality we used the power series representation of the
exponential function: ez =
∑∞
k=0
zk
k! . Thus, from (A.9) we can derive that, for any
γ > 0,
(A.10) d1/γ ≤ γ · d
ln d
=⇒ Φd < γ d
ln d
,
Using γd =
ln d
W(d) as defined in the statement of our lemma, we compute:
d1/γd = d
W(d)
ln d = eW(d)
and
γd
d
ln d
=
ln d
W(d)
d
ln d
=
d
W(d) .
Thus, since from the definition of function W we know that
(A.11) W(d)eW(d) = d,
we deduce that γ = γd indeed satisfies the left hand side of (A.10), giving us the
desired upper bound for Φd.
For the asymptotic behaviour of γd when d grows large, observe that by taking
logarithms in (A.11) we get
W(d) + lnW(d) = ln d
and so
lim
d→∞
γd = lim
d→∞
ln d
W(d) = limd→∞
[
lnW(d)
W(d) + 1
]
= 1 + lim
z→∞
ln z
z
= 1,
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since it is easy to see that limd→∞W(d) =∞.
Finally, let us now establish (A.6). Due to (A.7) that we have already proved, it is
enough to just show a lower bound of limd→∞ Φdd/ ln d ≥ 1. We will do this by showing
that Φd ≥ dln d for sufficiently large values of d. Indeed, by (A.9) this is equivalent to
proving that (
1 +
ln d
d
)d
≥ d
ln d
,
which from Lemma A.1 we know it holds for all d ≥ 9.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3.2. To decongest notation a bit in the proof, we will
drop the d subscripts from cd and βd whenever this is causing no confusion. Starting
with (3.3), if we solve with respect to β we get
(A.12) Φd +
1
β
≥ Φ1+ 2dd ⇐⇒ β ≤
1
Φd(Φ
2/d
d − 1)
=
Φd
2Φd + 1
,
where for the last equality we used the fact that
Φ
2/d
d =
(
1 +
1
Φd
)2
=
1
Φ2d
+
2
Φd
+ 1
which is a direct consequence of the definition of Φd:
Φd+1d = (Φd + 1)
d ⇐⇒ Φ1+ 1dd = Φd + 1 ⇐⇒ Φ1/dd = 1 +
1
Φd
.
Substituting (3.2) into (A.12),
1− Φ−cd ≤
Φd
2Φd + 1
⇐⇒ Φ−cd ≥
Φd + 1
2Φd + 1
⇐⇒ c ≤ ln(2Φd + 1)− ln(Φd + 1)
ln Φd
,
which holds by the very definition of c in (3.1) if we relax the floor operator.
Let us now move to (3.4), and in particular lower-bound the values of parameter
β, as d grows large. Due to the floor operator in (3.1), parameter c can be lower
bounded by
c ≥ ln(2Φd + 1)− ln(Φd + 1)
ln Φd
− 1
d
= logΦd
2Φd + 1
Φd + 1
− 1
d
and since β is increasing with respect to c,
(A.13) β = 1− Φ−cd ≥ 1−
Φd + 1
2Φd + 1
Φ
1/d
d = 1−
Φd + 1
2Φd + 1
(
1 +
1
Φd
)
.
Taking limits and recalling that limd→∞Φd =∞, we get the desired lower bound of
lim
d→∞
β ≥ 1− 1
2
· (1 + 0) = 1
2
.
The upper bound of β ≤ 12 can be easily derived by (A.12):
β ≤ Φd
2Φd + 1
≤ Φd
2Φd
=
1
2
.
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For small values of d, and in particular in order to prove that β ≥ 0.38, one
can numerically compute the values for β directly from (3.1). For example, for d =
9, . . . , 100, these values are shown in Figure 3.1. The lower and upper red lines in
Figure 3.1 correspond to the relaxation of the floor operator we used in the lower
and upper bounds for β in (A.13) and (A.12), respectively. The actual values of β
lie between these two lines. Using these values and the resulting monotonicity for β,
one can also prove the lower bound of 3 for dc, by observing that by setting d = 9 in
(3.1) we have that for any d ≥ 9
d · c ≥
⌊
9
ln(2 · Φ9 + 1)− ln(Φ9 + 1)
ln(Φ9)
⌋
≈ b3.368c = 3,
since Φ9 ≈ 5.064.
A.3. Proof of Claim 3.3. Since we have fixed that sj = s˜j for all players j < i
and also the strategies of players j > i+ µ have no effect on the cost of player i (and
in particular in (3)), it is safe if we briefly abuse notation and for now assume that
s−i = (si+1, . . . , si+µ).
We generate the desired dominating profile s′−i inductively, by running Proce-
dure Dominate(s−i, i) described formally below, scanning and modifying profile s−i
from right to left.
Procedure Dominate(s−i, i)
Input: Profile s−i = (si+1, . . . , si+µ); Player i ∈ {µ+ 1, . . . , n}
Output: Profile s′−i = (s
′
i+1, . . . , s
′
i+µ) of the form described in Items 1 to 3
of Claim 3.3, that satisfies (3.7)
1 s′−i ← s−i;
2 s′i+µ ← s∗i+µ;
3 k ← i+ µ− 1;
4 while exists j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , k − 1} such that s′j = s∗j do
5 s′k ← s˜k;
6 k ← k − 1;
end
First, it is not difficult to see that the output profile s′−i of Dominate(s−i, i)
indeed has the desired format described in Items 1 to 3 of Claim 3.3. In particular,
after any execution of the while-loop in lines 4–6 of Procedure Dominate, s′j = s˜j
for any j = k + 1, . . . , i + µ − 1. Furthermore, it is also easy to see that switching
player’s i + µ strategy to s′i+µ = s
∗
i+µ can only increase player’s i cost, i.e. (3.7) is
satisfied after line 2 of Dominate: if player i+µ chooses s˜i+µ instead, she contributes
nothing to the cost of player i, since she does not put her weight in any of the facilities
i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ played by player i.
So, it remains to be shown that after every iteration of the while-loop, condition
(3.7) is maintained. Since in any such loop only the strategy of player k is possibly
switched from s∗k to s˜k, it is enough if we show that Ci(s˜k, s
′
−k) ≥ Ci(s∗k, s′−k) or,
since for any facility j < k it holds that xj(s˜k, s
′
−k) = xj(s
∗
k, s
′
−k), equivalently
i+µ∑
j=k
cj(xj(s˜k, s
′
−k)) ≥
i+µ∑
j=k
cj(xj(s
∗
k, s
′
−k)).
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If we let zj , for any j ≥ k, denote the load on facility j induced by every player except
from player k, that is formally
zj =
∑
{w` | ` ∈ {j − µ, . . . , j} \ {k} ∧ j ∈ s′` } ,
the above can be written as
i+µ∑
j=k+1
[cj(zj + wk)− cj(zj)] ≥ ck(zk + wk)− ck(zk).
Thus, it is sufficient only take j = i+ µ in the above sum and just prove that
ci+µ(zi+µ + wk)− ci+µ(zi+µ) ≥ ck(zk + wk)− ck(zk),
which is equivalent to
(A.14) w−(i+µ−k)(d+1)
(zi+µ + wk)
d − zdi+µ
(zk + wk)d − zdk
≥ 1.
If we define
A =
{
j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , k − 1} ∣∣ sj = s∗j } ,
that is, A is the set of players below k (and above i) that do not contribute with their
weight to the cost of players k and i+ µ, we have that
zk =
k−1∑
j=k−µ
j /∈A
wj = αwk −
∑
j∈A
wj
and
zi+µ =
i+µ∑
j=i
j /∈A∪{k}
wj = (α+ 1)wi+µ − wk −
∑
j∈A
wj ,
because by our inductive process we know that s′j = s˜j for all j = k+ 1, . . . , i+µ− 1.
Thus
zi+µ = zk + (α+ 1)(wi+µ − wk).
Now we can rewrite the left hand side of (A.14) as
w−(i+µ−k)(d+1)
[zk + (α+ 1)wi+µ − αwk]d − [zk + (α+ 1)wi+µ − (α+ 1)wk]d
(zk + wk)d − zdk
,
and, if we additionally define for simplicity
ζ:=wλ, where λ:=µ− k + i ∈ {1, . . . , µ− 2}
and
yk:=
zk
wk
,
(A.14) can be written as
ζ−(d+1)
[yk + (α+ 1)ζ − α]d − [yk + (α+ 1)ζ − α− 1]d
(yk + 1)d − ydk
≥ 1,
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or more simply,
ζ−(d+1)f(x, y) ≥ 1
if we use function f from Lemma A.2 with values
x = (α+ 1)wλ − α− 1 = (α+ 1)(ζ − 1) > 0 and y = yk > 0.
Deploying the monotonicity of f from Lemma A.2 and using that
y =
zk
wk
= α− 1
wk
∑
j∈A
wj ≤ α− 1
wk
wi+1 = α−wi+1−k = α−wλ−µ+1 ≤ α− (1−β)ζ,
where the first inequality holds due to the fact that from the while-loop test in line 4
of Procedure Dominate we know that A 6= ∅ and the last one because of 1−β = w−µ,
we finally get that it is enough if we show that
ζd+1 ≤ f ((α+ 1)(ζ − 1), α− (1− β)ζ) for all ζ ∈
[
1,
1
1− β
]
,
since ζ ≥ w1 ≥ 1 and ζ ≤ wµ−2 ≤ wµ = (1 − β)−1. But this is is satisfied, due to
(A.1) of Lemma A.2, since we have selected our parameters c = cd and β = βd as in
Lemma 3.2.
A.4. Proof of (3.8). In any such profile, player i+ µ plays s∗i+µ and
• Either all other players j = i+ 1, . . . , i+ µ− 1 play s˜j , in which case
Ci(s˜i, s
′
−i) = ci+µ
(
i+µ∑
`=i
w`
)
+
i+µ−1∑
j=i+1
cj
 j−1∑
`=j−µ
w`

= ci+µ
(
(α+ 1)wi+µ
)
+
i+µ−1∑
j=i+1
cj
(
αwj
)
= w−(i+µ)(d+1)(α+ 1)dwd(i+µ) +
i+µ−1∑
j=i+1
w−j(d+1)αdwdj
= w−(i+µ)(α+ 1)d +
i+µ−1∑
j=i+1
w−jαd
= w−i
(α+ 1)dw−µ + αd µ−1∑
j=1
w−j

= w−i
[
(α+ 1)dw−µ + αd(α− w−µ)] ,
the last equality holding due to the definition of α.
• Or there exists a single player k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , i+µ−1} that plays s∗k (instead
of s˜k which corresponds exactly to the previous case), in which case
Ci(s˜i, s
′
−i) ≤ ck
 k∑
`=k−µ
w`
+ ci+µ(i+µ∑
`=i
w` − wk
)
+
i+µ∑
j=i+1
j 6=k,i+µ
cj
 j−1∑
`=j−µ
w`

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= ck
(
(α+ 1)wk
)
+ ci+µ
(
(α+ 1)wi+µ − wk)+ i+µ−1∑
j=i+1
j 6=k
cj
(
αwj
)
= w−i
[
(α+ 1)dw−(k−i) + (α+ 1− wk−i−µ)dw−µ
+αd(α− w−µ − w−(k−i))
]
,
which is decreasing with respect to k, so taking the smallest possible value
k = i+ 1 we have that
Ci(s˜i, s
′
−i) ≤
w−i
[
(α+ 1)dw−1 + (α+ 1− w1−µ)dw−µ + αd(α− w−µ − w−1)] .
Considering both the above possible scenarios, in order to prove (3.8) it is thus suffi-
cient to make sure that
(A.15) αd(α− w−µ) < (α+ 1)d(1− w−µ)
and
(A.16) (α+ 1− w1−µ)dw−µ + αd(α− w−µ − w−1) < (α+ 1)d(1− w−1).
For (A.15), its left-hand side can be written as
(βΦd)
d (βΦd − (1− β)) < (βΦd)d (βΦd) = βd+1Φd+1d = βd+1(Φd + 1)d,
the first inequality holding because β < 1, while the right-hand side is
(βΦd + 1)
d(1− (1− β)) = βd+1
(
Φd +
1
β
)d
.
Thus it is enough to prove that
(Φd + 1)
d ≤
(
Φd +
1
β
)d
,
which holds since β ∈ (0, 1).
For (A.16), the left-hand side is written as(
βΦd + 1−
(
1 +
1
Φd
)
(1− β)
)d
(1− β)
+ (βΦd)
d
(
βΦd − (1− β)−
(
1 +
1
Φd
)−1)
=
(
βΦd + β − 1− β
Φd
)d
(1− β) + βdΦdd
(
βΦd − (1− β)− Φd
Φd + 1
)
< (βΦd + β)
d
(1− β) + βdΦdd
(
βΦd − Φd
Φd + 1
)
=βd (Φd + 1)
d
(1− β) + βdΦdd
(
βΦd − Φd
Φd + 1
)
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=βd(Φd)
d+1(1− β) + βdΦdd
(
βΦd − Φd
Φd + 1
)
=βdΦdd
(
Φd − βΦd + βΦd − Φd
Φd + 1
)
=βd
Φd+2d
Φd + 1
and the right-hand side
(βΦd + 1)
d
(
1−
(
1 +
1
Φd
)−1)
= βd
(
Φd +
1
β
)d
1
Φd + 1
.
Thus it suffices to prove that
Φd+2d ≤
(
Φd +
1
β
)d
,
which holds due to (3.3) since we have already selected parameter c = cd as in (3.1).
Appendix B. Upper Bound Proofs.
B.1. Technical Lemmas.
Lemma B.1. For any positive integer m and real x > 0,(
1 +
1
x
)m
≥ 1 + m+ 1
2x
Proof. Expanding the power in the left hand side we get(
1 +
1
x
)m
=
m∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
1
xj
≥
1∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
1
xj
= 1 +
m
x
≥ 1 + m+ 1
2x
,
since
m
x
≥ m+ 1
2x
⇐⇒ m ≥ m+ 1
2
⇐⇒ m ≥ 1.
Lemma B.2. For any integer m ≥ 0 and real x ≥ 0,
(x+ 1)m+1 − xm+1 ≤ m+ 1
2
[(x+ 1)m + xm] .
Proof. Expanding the powers, our inequality can be rewritten equivalently as:
m+1∑
j=0
(
m+ 1
j
)
xj − xm+1 ≤ m+ 1
2
 m∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
xj + xm

m−1∑
j=0
(
m+ 1
j
)
xj + (m+ 1)xm ≤ m+ 1
2
m−1∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
xj + 2xm
 .
m−1∑
j=0
(
m+ 1
j
)
xj ≤ m+ 1
2
m−1∑
j=0
(
m
j
)
xj .
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Now, we can see that the above holds by bounding each term; for integers j =
0, 1, . . . ,m− 1: (
m+ 1
j
)
=
(m+ 1)!
(m+ 1− j)!j! =
m+ 1
m+ 1− j
m!
(m− j)!j!
=
m+ 1
m+ 1− j
(
m
j
)
≤ m+ 1
2
(
m
j
)
.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 4.2. Observe that from the definition of Am in (4.5),
(Am(x))
−1 =
1
m+ 1
+
1
2x
which is decreasing with respect to m, and(
Am(x)
m+ 1
)−1
= 1 +
m+ 1
2x
,
which is increasing with respect to m. For the remaining sequence, observe that for
any integer m ≥ 0 and reals y ≥ x ≥ 1,
Am(x)
Am(y)
≥ Am+1(x)
Am+1(y)
⇐⇒ Am+1(y)
Am(y)
≥ Am+1(x)
Am(x)
,
so it is enough to show that function Am+1(x)Am(x) is monotonically increasing with respect
to x ≥ 0. Indeed,
Am+1(x)
Am(x)
=
1
m+1 +
1
2x
1
m+2 +
1
2x
=
2x(m+ 2) + (m+ 1)(m+ 2)
2x(m+ 1) + (m+ 1)(m+ 2)
= 1 +
1
m+ 1
(
1 +
m+ 2
2x
)−1
.
B.3. Proof of Lemma 4.3. First for (4.9), notice that it can be rewritten
equivalently as
1
m+ 1
≤ Sm(γx)
(γx)m+1
=
1
Am(γx)
≤ 1
Am(γ)
,
which holds, as an immediate consequence of the monotonicity of function Am (see
(4.6)), given that γx ≥ γ ≥ 1. For (4.8), it is enough to prove just the special case
when w = 1, i.e.,
(B.1)
γm+1
Am(γ)
= Sm(γ) ≤ Sm(γx+ γ)− Sm(γx)
(x+ 1)m
≤ γm+1,
since then it is not difficult to check that we can recover the more general case in (4.8)
by simply substituting γ := γw and x := xw in (B.1).
It is not difficult to check that (B.1) holds for m = 0, recalling that S0(x) = x for
all x ≥ 0. Next, assume for the remainder of the proof that m ≥ 1.
For the left-hand inequality of (B.1) first, it can be equivalently rewritten as:
(x+ 1)m
(
1
m+ 1
γm+1 +
1
2
γm
)
≤
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1
m+ 1
γm+1
[
(x+ 1)m+1 − xm+1] 1
2
γm [(x+ 1)m − xm]
1
2
xm ≤ γ
m+ 1
[
(x+ 1)m+1 − (x+ 1)m − xm+1] ,
and since γ ≥ 1, it is sufficient to show that
(m+ 1)xm ≤ 2 [(x+ 1)m+1 − (x+ 1)m − xm+1]
and thus, enough to show that
(m+ 1)xm ≤ 2x [(x+ 1)m − xm] .
Now observe that the above trivially holds if x = 0, while for x > 0 it can be
equivalently written as
m+ 1
2x
≤
(
1 +
1
x
)m
− 1,
which holds due to Lemma B.1.
For the right-hand inequality of (B.1), it can be equivalently written as:
1
m+ 1
γ
[
(x+ 1)m+1 − xm+1]+ 1
2
[(x+ 1)m − xm] ≤ γ(x+ 1)m
2γ
[
(x+ 1)m+1 − xm+1] ≤ (m+ 1) [(2γ − 1)(x+ 1)m + xm]
(x+ 1)m+1 − xm+1 ≤ (m+ 1)
[(
1− 1
2γ
)
(x+ 1)m +
1
2γ
xm
]
.
Since γ ≥ 1, we know that 12γ ∈ [0, 12 ]. Thus, taking into consideration that (x+1)m >
xm ≥ 0, the linear combination on the right-hand side of the above inequality is
minimized for 12γ =
1
2 . So, it is enough to show that
(x+ 1)m+1 − xm+1 ≤ m+ 1
2
[(x+ 1)m + xm] ,
which holds due to Lemma B.2.
B.4. Equivalence of Theorem 4.4 and Claim 4.7. To verify that Claim 4.7
gives indeed an equivalent restatement of Theorem 4.4, fix an arbitrary W ≥ 1 and
observe the equivalence
α = Ad(γW ) =
2(d+ 1)γW
2γW + d+ 1
⇐⇒ γ = 1
2W
α(d+ 1)
d+ 1− α,
by using the definition of function Ad from (4.5). Therefore, it is not difficult to also
compute that
d+ 1
Ad(γ)
= (d+ 1)
(
1
d+ 1
+
1
2γ
)
= 1 +
d+ 1
2
1
γ
= 1 +
d+ 1
2
· 2W d+ 1− α
α(d+ 1)
= 1 +W
(
d+ 1
α
− 1
)
.
Appendix C. Beyond Polynomial Latencies: Euler-Maclaurin. Our
definition of the approximate potential function in Subsections 4.2 and 4.4 was based
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in Faulhaber’s formula (4.3) for the sum of powers of positive integers. This approach
can be generalized further, by considering the Euler-Maclaurin summation formula12
:
(C.1)
n∑
j=0
f(j) =
∫ n
0
f(t) dt+
1
2
[f(n) + f(0)] +
m∑
j=2
Bj
j!
[f (j−1)(n)− f (j−1)(0)] +Rm,
for any infinitely differentiable function f : [0,∞) −→ (0,∞) (with f (j) denoting the
j-th order derivative of f) and integers n,m ≥ 1, where Bj denotes the Bernoulli num-
bers we have already used in Subsection 4.2 and the error-term Rm can be bounded
by
(C.2) |Rm| ≤ 2ζ(m)
(2pi)m
∫ n
0
∣∣∣f (m)(t)∣∣∣ dt,
where ζ(m) =
∑∞
j=1
1
jm is Riemann’s zeta function. Thus, if function f is such that
the quantity in the right-hand side of (C.2) eventually vanishes, i.e. for any real x ≥ 0,
(C.3) lim
m→∞
ζ(m)
(2pi)m
∫ x
0
∣∣∣f (m)(t)∣∣∣ dt = 0,
then we can define our approximate-potential candidate function on any real x ≥ 0
by generalizing (C.1):
(C.4) S(x) = Sf (x) =
∫ x
0
f(t) dt+
1
2
[f(x) + f(0)] +
∞∑
j=2
Bj
j!
[f (j−1)(x)− f (j−1)(0)].
For example, it is not difficult to see that, for any monomial f(x) = xd of degree
d ≥ 1, condition (C.3) is indeed satisfied (since f (m) = 0 for all m ≥ d + 1) and,
because also f (m)(0) = 0 and f (m)(x) = d!(d−m)!x
d−m, one recovers exactly (4.3) from
(C.4) above.
Let us now demonstrate this general approach for latency functions f that are
not polynomials. For the remaining of this section let f(x) = ex be an exponential
delay function. Then, for any y ≥ 0,
lim
m→∞
ζ(m)
(2pi)m
∫ y
0
∣∣∣f (m)(t)∣∣∣ dt = (ey − 1) lim
m→∞
ζ(m)
(2pi)m
= 0,
since limm→∞ ζ(m) = 1 and limm→∞(2pi)m = ∞. Thus, condition (C.3) is satisfied,
and we can define from (C.4)
S(x) =
∫ x
0
et dt+
1
2
[ex + e0] +
∞∑
j=2
Bj
j!
[ex − e0]
= (ex − 1)− 1
2
(ex − 1) +
∞∑
j=2
Bj
j!
(ex − 1) + ex
= (ex − 1)
∞∑
j=0
Bj
j!
+ ex.
12See, e.g., [31, Section 9.5] and [40].
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But since for the integer value x = 1 we know that S(1) =
∑1
j=0 f(j) = 1 + e, it must
be that
e+ 1 = (ex − 1)
∞∑
j=0
Bj
j!
+ e ⇐⇒
∞∑
j=0
Bj
j!
=
1
e− 1 .
So, we finally have that
S(x) = (ex − 1) 1
e− 1 + e
x =
ex+1 − 1
e− 1 .
From this, for all reals x ≥ 0, w > 0 we compute:
(C.5)
S(x+ w)− S(x)
wf(x+ w)
=
1
e− 1
ex+w+1 − ex+1
wex+w
=
e
e− 1
1− e−w
w
,
which does not depend on x. Thus, from (4.1) in Lemma 4.1 we deduce that exact pure
Nash equilibria always exist for weighted congestion games with exponential latencies.
The function S we defined in (C.5) essentially serves as a weighted potential [43]; its
global minimum is a pure Nash equilibrium. Notice here that these results regarding
exponential latency functions were already known by the work of Panagopoulou and
Spirakis [45].
Appendix D. Social Optimum is a (d + 1)-Approximate Equilibrium.
In this section we show that the socially optimum solution is itself an (d + 1)-
appproximate equilibrium, where d is the maximum degree of the polynomial latency
functions. We must mention here that, the approximation factor on its own, i.e. d+1,
does not constitute a novel contribution: existence of (d + 1)-approximate equilibria
was already known by the work of Harks and Klimm [33]. However, the new element
in Theorem D.1 below is that this can be achieved by all optimum solutions.
Related to this, we would like to emphasize that, if we only cared about showing
the existence of an optimal solution that is a (d + 1)-approximate equilibrium, this
would have been an immediate corollary of our main upper bound result: by simply
setting α = d+1 in Theorem 4.4 we get exactly what we want. However, the following
theorem demonstrates the stronger statement that all social cost minimizers have the
property we want.
Theorem D.1. Consider any weighted congestion game with polynomial latency
functions of maximum degree d and let s∗ be a strategy profile that minimizes social
cost. Then s∗ is a (d + 1)–approximate pure Nash equilibrium. As an immediate
consequence, the Price of Stability of (d+ 1)–approximate Nash equilibria is 1.
Proof. Let c be an arbitrary cost function of maximum degree d with non-negative
coefficients, i.e., c(x) =
∑d
j=0 ajx
j , with aj ≥ 0 for all j. We will first show that for
all w > 0 and x ≥ 0:
w · c(x+ w) ≤ (x+ w) · c(x+ w)− x · c(x) ≤ (d+ 1) · w · c(x+ w).(D.1)
To this end, with z = xw , we get
(x+ w) · c(x+ w)− x · c(x) =
d∑
j=0
aj ·
[
(x+ w)j+1 − xj+1]
=
d∑
j=0
aj · wj+1
[
(1 + z)j+1 − zj+1]
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=
d∑
j=0
aj · wj+1
[
j∑
k=0
(
j + 1
k
)
zk
]
,
and
w · c(x+ w) =
d∑
j=0
aj · w(x+ w)j
=
d∑
j=0
aj · wj+1
[
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
zk
]
.
Clearly,
(
j+1
k
) ≥ (jk) for all integer j ∈ [0, d], k ∈ [0, j], which immediately implies the
first inequality in (D.1). To see the second inequality, observe that(
j+1
k
)(
j
k
) = j + 1
j + 1− k ≤ j + 1 ≤ d+ 1.
Since s∗ minimizes social cost, for all players i ∈ [n] and strategies si ∈ Si,
C(s∗) ≤ C(si, s∗−i).
Denoting ye =
∑
j∈[n]\{i}:e∈s∗j wj , from (D.1), we get
0 ≤ C(si, s∗−i)− C(s∗)
=
∑
e∈si\s∗i
[(ye + wi)ce(ye + wi)− yece(ye)]
−
∑
e∈s∗i \si
[(ye + wi)ce(ye + wi)− yece(ye)]
=
∑
e∈si
[(ye + wi)ce(ye + wi)− yece(ye)]−
∑
e∈s∗i
[(ye + wi)ce(ye + wi)− yece(ye)]
≤ (d+ 1)
∑
e∈si
wi · ce(ye + wi)−
∑
e∈s∗i
wi · ce(ye + wi)
= (d+ 1)Ci(si, s
∗
−i)− Ci(s∗),
or equivalently Ci(s
∗) ≤ (d + 1)Ci(si, s∗−i). So s∗ is a (d + 1)-approximate Nash
equilibrium.
Acknowledgments. We thank the anonymous reviewers for the careful and
thorough reading of our manuscript, and for their valuable feedback.
References.
[1] M. Abramowitz and I. A. Stegun. Handbook of Mathematical Functions with
Formulas, Graphs, and Mathematical Tables. Dover, New York, 9th printing,
10th gpo printing edition, 1964. ISBN 0486612724. URL http://people.math.
sfu.ca/∼cbm/aands/.
[2] H. Ackermann, H. Ro¨glin, and B. Vo¨cking. On the impact of combinatorial
structure on congestion games. Journal of the ACM, 55(6):1–22, Dec. 2008.
doi:10.1145/1455248.1455249.
THE PRICE OF STABILITY OF WEIGHTED CONGESTION GAMES 37
[3] S. Aland, D. Dumrauf, M. Gairing, B. Monien, and F. Schoppmann. Exact price
of anarchy for polynomial congestion games. SIAM Journal on Computing, 40
(5):1211–1233, Jan. 2011. doi:10.1137/090748986.
[4] S. Albers. On the value of coordination in network design. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 38(6):2273–2302, 2009.
[5] E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E´. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T. Rough-
garden. The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 38(4):1602–1623, Jan. 2008. doi:10.1137/070680096.
[6] B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, and A. Epstein. The price of routing unsplittable flow.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 42(1):160–177, Jan. 2013. doi:10.1137/070702370.
[7] J. Bernoulli. Ars conjectandi, opus posthumum. Accedit Tractatus de seriebus in-
finitis, et epistola gallice´ scripta de ludo pilae reticularis. impensis Thurnisiorum,
fratrum, Basileæ, 1713. URL https://books.google.de/books?id=ebdcNfPz8l8C.
[8] K. Bhawalkar, M. Gairing, and T. Roughgarden. Weighted congestion games:
The price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness. ACM Trans.
Econ. Comput., 2(4):141–1423, Oct. 2014. doi:10.1145/2629666.
[9] V. Bilo`. A unifying tool for bounding the quality of non-cooperative solu-
tions in weighted congestion games. Theory of Computing Systems, Dec. 2017.
doi:10.1007/s00224-017-9826-1.
[10] V. Bilo`, I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, and G. Monaco. Improved Lower Bounds on
the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games. Theory of Computing
Systems, 52(4):668–686, May 2013. doi:10.1007/s00224-012-9411-6.
[11] V. Bilo` and C. Vinci. On the impact of singleton strategies in congestion games.
2017. doi:10.4230/lipics.esa.2017.17.
[12] V. Bilo`, M. Flammini, and L. Moscardelli. The price of stability for undirected
broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 2014.
[13] I. Caragiannis, M. Flammini, C. Kaklamanis, P. Kanellopoulos, and
L. Moscardelli. Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing. Algorith-
mica, 61(3):606–637, 2010. doi:10.1007/s00453-010-9427-8.
[14] I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik. Efficient computa-
tion of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games. In 2011 IEEE
52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Oct. 2011.
doi:10.1109/focs.2011.50.
[15] I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik. Approximate pure
Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: Existence, efficient computa-
tion, and structure. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., 3(1):2:1–2:32, Mar. 2015.
doi:10.1145/2614687.
[16] H.-L. Chen and T. Roughgarden. Network design with weighted players. Theory
of Computing Systems, 45(2):302, July 2008. doi:10.1007/s00224-008-9128-8.
[17] G. Christodoulou and M. Gairing. Price of stability in polynomial congestion
games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 4(2):1–17, Dec. 2015.
doi:10.1145/2841229.
[18] G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias. The price of anarchy of finite con-
gestion games. In STOC ’05: Proceedings of the 37th annual ACM sympo-
sium on Theory of computing, pages 67–73, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
doi:10.1145/1060590.1060600.
[19] G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias. On the price of anarchy and stability of
correlated equilibria of linear congestion games. In Algorithms - ESA 2005, 13th
Annual European Symposium, pages 59–70, 2005.
38 G. CHRISTODOULOU, M. GAIRING, Y. GIANNAKOPOULOS, AND P. G. SPIRAKIS
[20] G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, and P. G. Spirakis. On the performance of
approximate equilibria in congestion games. Algorithmica, 61(1):116–140, 2011.
doi:10.1007/s00453-010-9449-2.
[21] G. Christodoulou, M. Gairing, Y. Giannakopoulos, and P. G. Spirakis. The price
of stability of weighted congestion games. In 45th International Colloquium on
Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2018, July 9-13, 2018, Prague,
Czech Republic, pages 150:1–150:16, 2018. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.150.
[22] J. H. Conway and R. K. Guy. The Book of Numbers. Springer New York, 1996.
doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4072-3.
[23] J. Dunkel and A. S. Schulz. On the complexity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
in congestion and local-effect games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 33(4):
851–868, 2008. ISSN 0364765X, 15265471.
[24] A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, and K. Talwar. The complexity of pure Nash
equilibria. In Proceedings of the Thirty-sixth Annual ACM Symposium on The-
ory of Computing, STOC ’04, pages 604–612, New York, NY, USA, 2004.
doi:10.1145/1007352.1007445.
[25] J. Faulhaber. Academia Algebræ: Darinnen die miraculosische Inventiones
zu den ho¨chsten Cossen weiters continuirt und profitiert werden. Johann Ul-
rich Scho¨nigs, Augspurg, 1631. URL https://books.google.de/books?id=0pw
AAAAcAAJ.
[26] M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik. Computing approxi-
mate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value weighted congestion games. In Web
and Internet Economics, pages 191–204. Springer International Publishing, 2017.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5 14.
[27] A. Fiat, H. Kaplan, M. Levy, S. Olonetsky, and R. Shabo. On the price of stabil-
ity for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations. In M. Bugliesi,
B. Preneel, V. Sassone, and I. Wegener, editors, Automata, Languages and
Programming: 33rd International Colloquium (ICALP), pages 608–618, 2006.
doi:10.1007/11786986 53.
[28] D. Fotakis, S. Kontogiannis, and P. Spirakis. Selfish unsplittable flows. Theoret-
ical Computer Science, 348(2):226–239, 2005.
[29] D. Fotakis, S. Kontogiannis, E. Koutsoupias, M. Mavronicolas, and P. Spi-
rakis. The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish
routing game. Theoretical Computer Science, 410(36):3305–3326, 2009.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004.
[30] M. Goemans, V. Mirrokni, and A. Vetta. Sink equilibria and convergence. In
46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’05),
pages 142–151, Oct. 2005. doi:10.1109/SFCS.2005.68.
[31] R. L. Graham, D. E. Knuth, and O. Patashnik. Concrete Mathematics: A Foun-
dation for Computer Science. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc.,
Boston, MA, USA, 1989.
[32] C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik. Approximate pure Nash equilibria
in weighted congestion games. In K. Jansen, J. D. P. Rolim, N. R. Devanur,
and C. Moore, editors, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Opti-
mization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2014), volume 28 of
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), pages 242–257. Schloss
Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2014. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-
RANDOM.2014.242.
[33] T. Harks and M. Klimm. On the existence of pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 37(3):419–436, 2012.
THE PRICE OF STABILITY OF WEIGHTED CONGESTION GAMES 39
doi:10.1287/moor.1120.0543.
[34] T. Harks, M. Klimm, and R. H. Mo¨hring. Characterizing the existence of po-
tential functions in weighted congestion games. Theory Comput Syst, 49:46–70,
2011. doi:10.1007/s00224-011-9315-x.
[35] T. Harks, M. Klimm, and R. H. Mo¨hring. Strong equilibria in games with the
lexicographical improvement property. International Journal of Game Theory,
42(2):461–482, 2012. doi:10.1007/s00182-012-0322-1.
[36] C. G. J. Jacobi. De usu legitimo formulae summatoriae maclaurinianae. Journal
fu¨r die reine und angewandte Mathematik, 12:263–272, 1834. URL http://www.
digizeitschriften.de/dms/img/?PID=GDZPPN00214008X.
[37] D. E. Knuth. Johann Faulhaber and sums of powers. Mathematics of Computa-
tion, 61(203):277–277, Sept. 1993. doi:10.1090/s0025-5718-1993-1197512-7.
[38] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou. Worst-case equilibria. In 16th Annual
Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS ’99, pages 404–
413, 1999.
[39] E. Lee and K. Ligett. Improved bounds on the price of stability in network
cost sharing games. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, EC ’13, pages 607–620. ACM, 2013. doi:10.1145/2482540.2482562.
[40] D. H. Lehmer. On the maxima and minima of Bernoulli polynomials. The
American Mathematical Monthly, 47(8):533, Oct. 1940. doi:10.2307/2303833.
[41] L. Libman and A. Orda. Atomic resource sharing in noncoopera-
tive networks. Telecommunication Systems, 17(4):385–409, Aug. 2001.
doi:10.1023/A:1016770831869.
[42] D. S. Mitrinovic´. Analytic Inequalities. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1970.
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-99970-3.
[43] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and economic behavior,
14(1):124–143, 1996.
[44] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E´. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors. Algorithmic
Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[45] P. N. Panagopoulou and P. G. Spirakis. Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in
weighted congestion games. Journal of Experimental Algorithmics, 11:27, Feb.
2007. doi:10.1145/1187436.1216584.
[46] R. W. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
International Journal of Game Theory, 2(1):65–67, 1973.
[47] R. W. Rosenthal. The network equilibrium problem in integers. Networks, 3(1):
53–59, 1973.
[48] T. Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. J. ACM, 62(5):
32:1–32:42, Nov. 2015. doi:10.1145/2806883.
[49] T. Roughgarden and E´. Tardos. How bad is selfish routing? J. ACM, 49(2):
236–259, Mar. 2002. doi:10.1145/506147.506153.
[50] T. Roughgarden and E´. Tardos. Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in
nonatomic congestion games. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2):389–403,
May 2004. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.004.
[51] A. S. Schulz and N. S. Moses. On the performance of user equilibria in traf-
fic networks. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’03, pages 86–87, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2003.
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
